ABSTRACT We analyze the impact of committed profit sharing for low-skilled workers on the amount of international outsourcing, if there is a bargaining between a firm and a labor union. In this bargaining round, the parties negotiate over the wage and provided effort. Here, we find that effort is independent of the bargaining power, profit sharing and wage. We further find that, in general, profit sharing leads to a substitution effect, which results in a decreased low-skilled wage and can therefore be an instrument to lower the demanded amount of outsourcing. For the optimal profit share, we find that it depends on the bargaining power of the union. The firm desists from such a remuneration scheme if the union is too strong. In contrast, if the firm is strong enough, the implementation becomes beneficial.
Introduction
It is without controversy that the high wage costs, especially in Western European countries, are the driving force for the growing business practice of offshoring and international outsourcing to Eastern European or Asian countries. One reason for the observed wage gap is the difference in the process of wage determination. While, in most Western European countries, wages for low-skilled workers are determined by bilateral bargaining between firms or employer federations and labor unions, in Eastern European or Asian countries wages are determined by 80 J. König & E. Koskela market forces, because unions here are much weaker (see for example Du Caju et al., 2008) .
In this paper, we assume that outsourcing is flexible, which means that it is determined after the domestic wage formation. Therefore, we are in line with Skaksen (2004) , who analyzes potential (non-realized) and realized international outsourcing. He distinguishes three cases: first, if the outsourcing costs are very low, the union desists from wage dumping to avoid outsourcing. Second, the firm desists from outsourcing if the associated costs are very high. In this case, the union can set a relatively high wage without the fear of substitution of domestic employment by external procurement. Third, for an intermediate cost level, the union can avoid outsourcing if the wage is equal to the outsourcing costs. Thus, the wage level depends positively on the outsourcing costs. In contrast, Braun and Scheffel (2007) find that the costs of outsourcing have an ambiguous effect on wage sets by the labor union.
It is common in the literature that outsourcing leads to lower wages and/or employment of low-skilled workers. 1 Thus, flexible outsourcing is a threat and the opportunity for the labor union to realize a high wage level will be dampened. However, the trade union wants to realize a high income for its members; thus, lower wages to prevent outsourcing are not possible. To work against this threat and solve this puzzle, another instrument has to be implemented that realizes a high work income and lowers the incentive for outsourcing by decreasing the wage.
Profit sharing can be such an instrument, which is also often demanded by labor unions and politics. The idea to share profit with workers is an old one. As shown in several studies (Fung, 1989 or Weitzman, 1987 , the implementation of profit sharing leads to lower bargained wage. Since, from the firm's point of view, wages and costs are decoupled, it can become a beneficial instrument for the firm. On the other side, wage income will be substituted by profit income, which is at first glance unfavorable for the worker. However, theoretically, this substitution can be done without losing total remunerations. Thus, through the lower base wage, domestic labor becomes advantageous, without any losses for the union or the workers. Another argument for implementing profit sharing is an improving working atmosphere by increasing the worker's identification with the firm. Since a better working atmosphere stimulates worker's effort for given wage level, a higher productivity will by induced. 2 The problem of this interpretation is that, if 1 See Feenstra and Hanson (1999) or Geishecker and Görg (2008) for empirical evidence. However, in a new strand of the literature, it is argued that it is not the skill level that is decisive for outsourcing but the ease of which certain tasks within this level can be outsourced. Following this task-basedapproach, where tasks are not synonymous with skills, the degree of outsourcing depends on the importance of routine or non-routine tasks and on the extent of personal interaction, see Blinder (2006) . Therefore the wage effect of outsourcing should differ within a group. Using German Data, Baumgarten et al. (2010) , find that outsourcing decreases the wage for the low-skilled worker, but this effect is heterogeneous within this group depending on the degree of interactivity or nonroutine content of the respective tasks. To keep the analysis simple we follow a broader definition of low-skilled workers and exclude the implementation of several tasks.
profit sharing is used to increase the individual effort, free-riding may occur due to the fact that individual effort is difficult to observe or measure. However, effort can be seen as a multi-dimensional variable. In line with this argument, in this paper effort is interpreted as a working condition, such as the speed of the production line or the length or number of breaks, which are clearly observable. While the unobservable effort is more a problem at the management level, the observable effort is significant for production line workers or low-skilled workers. Thus, if effort is observable, it can also be part of the negotiations between the firm and the union and therefore part of the working contract for low-skilled workers. 3 In this paper, we combine the idea of profit sharing and bargained effort for low-skilled workers in one framework. At first glance, this is confusing since highskilled workers such as managers usually participate in a profit sharing system. However, in the last few decades, there has been governmental stimulus of legislation and fiscal support for profit sharing implementation in the EU independent of workers skill level. 4 Additionally, in Pendleton et al. (2001) it is shown that a significant share of low-skilled workers in OECD countries participates in profit sharing schemes, but of course this proportion is smaller than for high-skilled workers.
In our analysis, we use this approach and ask: how does profit sharing influence flexible outsourcing? The analysis shows that the centrally set effort level is unaffected by the wage, profit sharing and bargaining power since it is an instrument to maximize the rent allocated in the bargaining round. In contrast, the bargained wage depends on bargaining power and profit sharing, where the base wage is negatively affected by profit sharing. Since outsourcing and domestic labor are substitutes, via the wage moderating effect, profit sharing lowers the outsourcing demand. However, the optimal profit share depends on the bargaining power of the labor union.
We proceed as follows. The basic structure of the theoretical framework is briefly presented in Section 2. In Section 2.1, we derive the optimal labor and outsourcing demand, while Section 2.2 investigates the effort and wage formation. The determination of the optimal profit share is presented in Section 2.3. Finally, we sum up in Section 3.
The Model
We assume that output depends on domestic labor and international outsourcing. 5 However, the input labor has two dimensions, the number of employed workers and the effort, i.e. the productivity provided by the workforce. The timing captures the idea that, given the mentioned political influences, the representative firm behaves as a Stackelberg leader and decides on the profit share. After the firm has made its decision, the firm and the labor union bargain over wage and effort. Since the firm has the right-to-manage, it determines its production inputs according to the labor and outsourcing demand after knowing the bargaining results. The timing sequence of the decisions is summarized in Figure 1 .
The decisions at each stage are analyzed by using backward induction. We are aware that our timing sequence can be changed in several ways. The firm could decide on profit sharing after the bargaining round, or effort can be determined by the worker individually. However, we neglect the individual determination of effort, since we have a different interpretation of it. We focus on observable effort, which can be measured and therefore fixed in a contract. Thus, there is no role for efficiency wages to stimulate individual but unobservable effort, which is decided conditional on the wage level. In addition, the firm can set the profit share after knowing the wage level. However, we see profit sharing as a voluntary commitment by the firm as a reaction to political measures and not as a reaction to the wage. Our structure describes the situation where wage bargaining is in a shorter periodical horizon, so that profit sharing can also be a reliable instrument for binding employees to the firm. In contrast, if profit sharing is decided after the wage formation, this would equal a situation where centralized wage bargaining covers a longer horizon. Of course, it is an empirical issue, which describes the institutional structure in a specific country.
Optimal Outsourcing and Labor Demand
In this section, we characterize the optimal labor demand and outsourcing by the representative firm, which takes profit sharing, wage and effort as given. The revenue function is characterized as
( 1) where the price of the output is normalized to unity, L is the amount of domestic labor, e characterizes the average effort level and M is the firm's labor input acquired from external suppliers through outsourcing. The parameter 0 < α < 1 indicates decreasing returns to scale and σ denotes the elasticity of substitution between effective labor and outsourcing. 6 Following the empirical evidence of Munch and Skaksen (2009), we assume that there is a substitutability between effective labor and outsourcing, i.e. we focus on 1 < σ < ∞. The firm decides on domestic labor and outsourcing to maximize the profit function
taking the negotiated effort e, wage w, and the profit share τ , as given. Furthermore, we assume that the costs of outsourcing c include other costs, such as transport and communication costs or costs for monitoring and quality control.
To simplify, we sum up these kinds of costs and assume that the unit costs of outsourcing are constant. The first-order conditions of equation (2) can be expressed as
The solution of the first-order conditions yields the conditional labor and outsourcing demand:
Resulting from our assumption of substitutability, we have Y LM < 0 respectively Y ML < 0. From the production function (1), one gets that this is only true for σ > 1 1−α , which will be assumed in the following analysis. As one can see from the conditional demand functions, domestic labor demand is a negative function of wage and a positive function of outsourcing costs and effort. Thus, higher outsourcing cost will increase domestic labor demand, which lies in conformity with empirics as shown by, for example, Görg and Hanley (2005) . However, the conditional labor demand does not directly depend on profit sharing. The reason for this effect is that profit sharing is a commitment by the firm and thus it works similarly to a profit tax. Due to the neutrality of such a tax, there is no direct impact of profit sharing on the labor demand. However, profit participation can have an indirect effect via effort or wage, which we analyze later. For outsourcing, we find that external procurement is a positive function of domestic wage rate and a negative function of outsourcing costs and effort (see Appendix 1).
In that case, the parameter ε characterizes the constant price elasticity. Thus, we implicitly keep in mind monopolistic competition similar to Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) , if α = 1 − 1/ε and ε > 1. Thus, both interpretations lead to the same result and ensure that the firm earns positive profit, which is needed for the existence of union wage bargaining.
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The wage elasticity of labor demand can be expressed as 7
where s = (w/e) 1−σ (w/e) 1−σ +c 1−σ characterizes the cost share of labor. In the absence of outsourcing, the wage elasticity is constant and smaller, i.e. η| M=0 = 1 1−α < η.
Wage and Effort Formation
As presented in Figure 1 , the firm has the right-to-manage, meaning that it determines employment according to its labor demand after knowing the bargaining results. In contrast to most bargaining models in our framework, the parties bargain not only over the wage but also over effort, since it is interpreted as an observable working condition and can therefore be part of the working contract. We model this specification as a simultaneous bargaining of wage and effort by using the Nash-Bargaining approach, where the Nash-Product is defined as
with U 0 and π 0 as the disagreement payoffs. In case of disagreement, there is no production, implying that every union member gets the exogenous outside option, i.e. U 0 = N · b. On the other side, for the firm's outside option we find that π 0 = 0. The reason is that domestic workers and outsourcing are substitutes but not perfect substitutes (see our assumption 1 < σ < ∞). Thus, if the bargaining breaks down, there is no employment, which results in no production. Due to this, the firm's outside option is zero.
To describe the preferences of the labor union, we model a utilitarian union
is the individual utility in case of employment or unemployment.
While the case of employment is connected with a certain level of effort, unemployment causes no effort. Since the worker dislikes effort, it is associated with a disutility, which is described by g(e) = γ e 1/γ with 0 < γ < 1. Since we assume that the individual utility is linear in income and disutility of effort, the utility for an unemployed worker corresponds to the overall remuneration less the disu-
. 8 On the other hand, the income of an unemployed worker is the exogenous minimum income b, i.e. u(b) = b.
Using our specification, we can write the union rent asŪ 
and
Using π e = w e L and π w = −L, condition (6b) can be rewritten as β ·Ū
π . Implementing this finding in equation (6a), we obtain −Ū w =Ū e · e w . Solving this expression, we find for the negotiated effort (see Appendix 2)
From equation (7) we obtain two clear-cut results. First, the bargained effort is independent of the relative bargaining power of the parties. This confirmed the finding in Bulkley (1992) that a monopoly union sets the same effort level as the firm would set unilaterally. The second finding is the surprising result that optimal effort level is independent of profit share or base wage. Thus, profit sharing does not increase productivity. However, an intuitive explanation can be found. In the bargaining, the union and the firm distribute the rent realized by the production. In the first step, they determine the size of this rent by setting the effort level, while the distribution of the created rent will be realized by the negotiated wage. Since the rent is influenced by effort, the highest rent is realized with the highest possible effort level, which results from the equalization of the weighted marginal utility of effort and marginal profit. Therefore, effort is independent from the bargaining power and profit sharing.
In a similar way, we can determine the optimal wage. Implementing the known expressionsŪ w , π w as well as
This is an implicit form, because the numerator and denominator of the mark-up depend on the wage rate. From equation (8) it can be seen that the wage depends on the bargaining power and the profit share. Knowing that effort is unaffected by profit sharing, we can show in which way the wage is influenced by this instrument, which helps us answer our research question. In the introduction, we mentioned that implementing profit sharing can have a potential wage moderation effect. To verify this, we can take a look at the equation above, which shows that profit sharing has only a direct effect on the wage level, which can be seen in the denominator. We call this effect the substitution effect, since it decreases the base wage, meaning that a former part of the base wage is substituted by profit income. Analytically, this can be shown by using the total differential of equation (8) 
since our assumptions σ > 1 and σ > For a better illustration, we also identify the effect of profit sharing in extreme cases concerning the bargaining power of the parties. In the case of unilateral wage setting by the firm, i.e. β = 0, we find dw dτ β=0 < 0. For the case of a monopoly labor union i.e. β = 1, we obtain a qualitatively similar effect,
In a similar way, we can also look at the wage reaction concerning changes in outsourcing costs. The reaction of the wage elasticity is described by η c = s c · 1
Higher outsourcing costs reduce, ceteris paribus, the demand for outsourcing. On the other hand, due to the substitutability of inputs, domestic labor demand increases and makes the labor demand more inelastic (as shown by, for example, Senses, 2010) , which opens the opportunity for the union to set a higher wage. Algebraically, the wage effect of changing outsourcing costs is given by
so that, in the presence of flexible outsourcing, higher outsourcing costs increase the wage. For this result, we can also give an intuitive explanation. Owing to higher outsourcing costs, external procurement becomes less attractive. This affects the bargaining positions of the firm and the union. While the union faces a better position, since the wage can increase without the fear of substitution, the firm faces a worse position, since the alternative is more expensive and therefore becomes less threatening. Due to this, the firm loses its power to dampen the wage and the union reaps more power to realize a higher wage. Since both effects are going in the same direction of higher wages, we observe a positive relationship of domestic wage and outsourcing costs. Concerning the more general case, in which both parties are endowed with a positive bargaining power, i.e. 0 < β < 1, we can summarize this as the following.
Proposition 1 In the presence of flexible outsourcing:
(a) the bargained effort is unaffected by base wage, profit sharing or bargaining power, (b) an implemented profit sharing system has a complementary character, (c) lower outsourcing costs will reduce the wage.
From the union's perspective, the wage effect of profit sharing can be explained by its marginal costs of an increasing wage. Since a higher wage decreases profit and therefore profit income, a higher profit share leads to a utility loss for the union. Due to this increasing effect on the union's marginal costs, higher profit sharing induces a less aggressive wage setting. Since the union becomes less aggressive, it faces a weaker bargaining position and the firm is able to achieve a lower wage (see Jackman, 1988 or Holmlund, 1990 .
However, our research question focuses on the effect of profit sharing on outsourcing. As the above analysis shows, profit sharing only affects the wage level. Since the outsourcing demand depends on the relation of domestic and foreign costs, we have an indirect working channel of profit sharing. Algebraically, the working mechanism of profit sharing on the amount of outsourcing can be derived from the conditional outsourcing demand, equation (3b). Here we find that
so that higher profit sharing leads to a lower outsourcing demand.
Proposition 2 Since an implemented profit sharing system decreases domestic marginal costs, outsourcing activities become less attractive and decrease.
As we know from equation (3b), the outsourcing demand depends on the outsourcing costs, effort and wage. However, if outsourcing costs and the effort level are constant, only wage changes affect the amount of outsourcing. Since profit sharing implies a less aggressive wage setting and a lower wage, this potential reduction alone induces lower outsourcing. The reason for this is intuitive. Owing to a lower wage level, the domestic marginal costs decrease, thereby increasing the advantage of integrated production and inducing a higher labor demand.
Although it is known that lower domestic marginal costs work in favor of domestic production and that profit sharing has a decreasing wage effect, to our knowledge ours is the first analysis that incorporates outsourcing, wage and effort bargaining with direct worker participation in the domestic firm's success via profit sharing. 10
Determination of the Optimal Profit Share
In the previous analysis, we have shown the effects of an implemented profit sharing system on the base wage and outsourcing demand. While, in the first part of our framework, profit sharing is a commitment by the firm, at this stage we have to analyze the grounds on which a firm will introduce it or not. To close the model, we therefore concentrate in this section on the optimal profit share. Thus, we answer the question, will the firm implement a profit sharing scheme, when the potential decreasing base wage effect is complemented by no effect on effort, respectively labor productivity?
The problem of the representative firm is to maximize its profit subject to labor demand (equation (3a)), outsourcing (equation (3b)), effort (equation (7)) and wage formation (equation (8)), so that
The first-order condition is −π + (1 − τ ) · π τ = 0. Using the former results, we get for profit π = (1 − α) · Y and the first derivative with respect to profit sharing π τ = −α · s w dw dτ · Y > 0 (see Appendix 3). Thus, the optimal profit share is given by
Answering our research question and showing whether the optimal firm behavior leads to the implementation of a profit sharing scheme or not, the expression above has to be solved for τ . As one sees, the profit share level is affected by the size of the profit share elasticity of the base wage, the cost share of domestic labor and the parameter α. Although we use a relatively simple model setting, it becomes very difficult to obtain an explicit formulation for the optimal profit share. Therefore, in the following analysis, we focus on two special cases of wage determination, (i) the case of a unilateral wage setting by the firm, i.e. β = 0; and (ii) the case of a monopoly labor union, i.e. β = 1. Case 1. Unilateral wage setting by the firm. This case implies that the firm sets wage and effort without a bargaining round. Since the former analysis shows that effort is independent of the relative bargaining power, there is no change in the effort level. However, the firm will use its power to decrease the wage level to the lowest possible level, taking into account the exogenous alternative income b. Using the specification β = 0, the wage level is
which is still an implicit formulation. With the simplification β = 0, the wage impact of profit sharing can be expressed by
Identical to the general case, profit sharing has a wage decreasing effect, if it is implemented. Inserting these results in the first-order condition (13), we obtain as the optimal committed profit share
It is easy to show that 0 < τ * | β=0 < 1 holds if 0 < s < 1. Thus, from the firms' perspective, it is optimal to implement profit sharing, if the firm alone decides about wage and effort. This finding can be explained as follows. Although profit sharing does not increase productivity, it decreases the wage, which is a positive incentive to implement a profit sharing scheme. Thus, the negative effect of contributing a part of its profit to the workers will be compensated by the wage decreasing effect and the resulting profit increase. This means that the loss due to sharing is lower than the gain due to the wage decrease. Since, in that case, there will be a positive profit share, the earlier derived wage and outsourcing effects exist. Case 2. Wage setting by a monopoly labor union. This is the opposing case to the analysis above. In contrast, now the union determines the wage and effort level unilaterally, i.e. β = 1. With this simplification, the associated wage level is,
Also in this case, the substitution effect of an implemented profit sharing system can be seen in the denominator. With the simplification β = 0, this effect can be expressed by
Using these results, the first-order condition for the optimal profit share can be solved to
It is easy to see that the optimal profit share in case of a monopoly labor union will be below 1. However, there could be the possibility that the firm desists from profit sharing. To analyze this, we insert η = σ · (1 − s) + s/(1 − α) in equation (15) and rewrite it to
Due to our assumptions that domestic labor and outsourcing are not perfect substitutes, i.e. 1 < σ < ∞, and the fact that the cost share of domestic labor is positive but smaller than one, the left-hand side is definitively negative. However, as one can see for τ * | β=1 ∈ (0; 1), the equation is not fulfilled since the right-hand side would be positive. Therefore, we will obtain a corner solution, where there is no profit sharing or the workforce obtains all profits. However, equation (15) demonstrates that the optimal profit share is smaller than one, which implies a negative optimal profit share. Since it is impossible to implement a negative profit share, we obtain a corner solution, where the firm desists from profit sharing, i.e.
and the firm owner keeps the overall profit. Similar to the case of the unilateral wage setting by the firm, the effort level is independent of profit sharing. This is plausible, since the trade union can avoid a higher disutility through effort provision but realize an adequate income by a relatively high wage setting. From the firm's perspective, the unchanged decision about effort provision leads to a contribution of its profit to the workers, which is an incentive to avoid the implementation of a profit-sharing scheme. Even the induced wage decrease cannot compensate this incentive. This can be explained by the fact that the wage level set by a monopoly union is relatively high and the induced wage decline is too small, respectively the wage reduction realized by the union is lower than the needed wage reduction by the firm. In contrast to Case 1, now the earlier wage and outsourcing effects of profit sharing do not exist, since it is optimal for the firm to desist from such an instrument.
Our analysis gives us several insights on the topic of profit sharing.
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One strand of the literature argues that profit sharing can stimulate the workers' motivation and, accordingly, the provided effort. In König and Koskela (2012) , this is shown if workers decide individually on the effort. However, and this is the central difference to this paper, we see effort as an observable working condition, which can be the result of bargaining as well. In this case, we find that effort is unaffected by wage or profit share and therefore the determination structure does matter. In contrast, the wage level depends on the bargaining power and also on profit sharing, if it is to be implemented. Concerning the wage effect of profit sharing, there are also differences between both analyses. While in König and Koskela (2012) , the wage effect in general is ambiguous, we find a wagedecreasing effect of profit sharing. There are also some differences regarding the decision to implement a profit sharing system. In this paper, we find that in case of a strong labor union, e.g. a monopoly union, the wage is relatively high and, from the firm's perspective, the possible wage reduction by profit sharing is too small to implement such a system. However, if the firm has the right to set the wage, the wage would be low enough and an implementation of profit sharing becomes beneficial for the firm. Therefore, we extend the analysis of König and Koskela (2012) , who find that, in the case of a monopoly union and individual effort determination, there will be such a remuneration scheme if the wage decreases or the productivity effect dominates the possible wage increase. We show that their conclusion 'that the kind of effort determination and thus the productivity effect is decisive to implement a profit sharing scheme' holds only for the underlying model set-up. As pointed out above, if the framework is changed, as in the present analysis, it is not the determination of effort, respectively the productivity effect, but the bargaining power of the union that seems to be the decisive variable concerning the decision to implement a remuneration scheme with profit sharing. Thus, in general, a productivity effect is not needed to implement a remuneration scheme where workers participate in a firm's success.
We can summarize our findings concerning the decision to implement a profit sharing system. We can therefore answer our main research question as follows: although a committed profit sharing system by the firm, in general, has a wage moderation effect, which lowers the demanded outsourcing activities, a profit maximizing firm will abstain from profit sharing depending on the union's bargaining power. 11
Concluding Remarks
Ordinary workers fear the consequences of international outsourcing, which may result in the loss of employment or a wage reduction. Although lower domestic labor costs can avoid the substitution, this is not in the interests of a labor union. The goal of this paper was to show the impact of an alternative compensation scheme that includes the profit participation of low-skilled workers. Thus, we have focused on the question: how does profit sharing influence outsourcing? This research is motivated by the fact that profit sharing can decrease the wage level and also increase effort, and therefore outsourcing can become less attractive. In our framework, we show that if the effort level is a part of the negotiations between firms and unions, it is independent of profit sharing. Thus, the general anticipated positive effect of profit sharing does not hold for a centralized determination. However, this results from the specific bargaining structure. Since the parties try to maximize the rent, which will be distributed among them, they choose the same optimal effort level independently from the associated bargaining power. The realized part of the rent is then determined by the wage, which depends on profit sharing and bargaining power. Here we find that profit sharing has a compensatory character, i.e. wage income can be substituted by profit income, which leads to a lower base wage. Thus, no productivity effect, only a wage moderation effect may occur by implementing a profit sharing scheme. Since outsourcing and domestic labor are substitutes, this can lead to a lower outsourcing demand.
However, this happens only if profit sharing will be implemented. As we demonstrated, this depends on the bargaining power of the labor union. If the labor union is too strong, a relatively high wage will be realized. Although profit sharing can lead to a lower wage, this reduction is too small to compensate the firm's owner for sharing part of the profit with the workforce and an implementation of profit sharing does not become beneficial. In contrast, if the labor union is weak enough, the wage level is relatively low and, accompanied by the wage reduction, the implementation of profit sharing becomes beneficial. Substituting equations (3a) and (A2), this expression can be simplified to
Rewriting the profit function to π = Y − K, the first-order condition for a profit maximum 1 = Thus, the resulting effort elasticity of labor demand is
In a similar way, we obtain L c > 0, M w > 0, M e < 0 and M c < 0.
